Religious Traditions and Public Policy*
Rabbi J. David Bleich, Ph.D.
If public policy is at all to be informed by religious
tradition it must begin with the cardinal religious value: Truth. So
fundamental is truth that no religion, and indeed no cognitive discipline,
would be conceivable unless truth be assumed as a meta-principle.*
The
term “truth” is used in this context not in the sense of truth-telling, but in
the sense of truth-recognition. Every moral system recognizes that, under
certain conditions, communication of a falsehood is not only devoid of odium,
but constitutes a moral imperative. A maniac wishes to know which button, when
depressed, will release a nuclear device. In that case the morally mandated
response is clear to all; in other situations the same clarity may not obtain.
Truth-telling in the physician-patient relationship is a case in point.
Curiously, or perhaps not so curiously, it is usually the physician who
advocates full disclosure, while the theologian may be quite prepared to clothe
the lie with moral sanction.
Although
communication of a falsehood to another individual may, at times, be
justifiable and even commendable, self-deception ought never to be condoned.
Thus, recognition and acknowledge-ment of factual verities must constitute the
first step in the formulation of public policy.
With the possible exception of abortion, the establishment of criteria for defining the time of death and the question of withholding treatment from terminally ill patients are the two most widely debated issues in bioethics today. Yet it is a fundamental misperception to regard these as two issues rather than as dual aspects of a single issue.
The
ongoing debate concerning adoption of so-called “brain death” criteria involves
absolutely no controversy with regard to either factual or ontological matters.
Definitions, by their very nature, are tautologies. The common law definition
of death as the “total stoppage of the circulation of the blood, and a
cessation of the animal and vital functions consequent thereupon, such as
respiration, pulsation, etc.” does little more than provide verbal shorthand
for statements affirming or negating the presence of those phenomena. Those
criteria, then, simply establish the truth-conditions which must exist in order
to render the proposition “X is dead” a true statement. The truth of the
statement lies in the satisfaction of the criteria, nothing more and nothing
less.
The
term “death” does not denote a state or a phenomenon semantically distinguished
from the criteria employed in its definition. The term itself is descriptive
rather than prescriptive and hence its use is entirely a matter of convention.
The
theologian may speak of death as occurring upon departure of the soul from the
body. If so, he is making a highly significant ontological statement. If he
further employs the common law definition of death he, in effect, declares that
“total stoppage of the circulation of blood, and a cessation of the animal and
vital functions consequent thereupon” are merely the physical symptoms of a
metaphysical event which cannot be perceived directly. Since metaphysical
events are not subject to empirical confirmation or disconfirmation, our
hypothetical theologian’s assertion cannot become a subject of medical dispute.
Indeed, a logical positivist adopting the verification principle of meaning
would say that the theologian assertion is neither true nor false, but is
bereft of meaning. Certainly, the clinical physician in urging adoption of
neurological criteria of death, does not at all pretend to possess some
esoteric knowledge of the perambulation of the soul which is denied to the
theologian. Indeed, the physician in question may deny the existence of the
soul. Whether or not he commits theological, metaphysical or lexicographical
error in doing so is open to debate, but he surely does not commit the fallacy
of self-contradiction.
The
theologian, if he is inclined to make a statement equating death with departure
of the soul from the body, understands the terms in question in precisely the
same manner as they are understood by ordinary mortals. He, however, makes an
additional assertion which is neither empirical nor descriptive in the physical
sense, but which is causal in nature. The theologian asserts the existence of a
causal connection between the physical events denoted by the term “death,”
viz., “total stoppage of the circulation of blood, and a cessation of the
animal and vital functions consequent thereupon” and the metaphysical
phenomenon of the soul’s departure from the body. I do not know whether our
theologian intends to assert that it is the metaphysical event which is the
cause of the physical effect or, conversely, that it is the physical phenomenon
which causes the metaphysical event. We may presume, I believe, that there is
little theological import in resolving the question of “Which came first, the
chicken or the egg?”
But
the association of chickens and eggs has profound import in fowl husbandry and
one may similarly presume that the putative departure of the soul from the body
at the time of death is not without theological ramifications. Thus, one
understands why, for the theologian, use of the term “death” involves more than
a mere convention. To be sure, the theologian well recognizes that words derive
meanings through common consensus. However, were the term “death” to be used in
common parlance solely as a synonym for the onset of rigor mortis, he
would be constrained to coin his own term (perhaps “meta-death” or “soular
death”) for the use as a needed verbal shorthand in theological and moral
discourse, and in the process he would perforce augment the esoteric jargon of
his discipline.
The
foregoing is intended neither as a theological excursus nor as a
tongue-in-cheek manner of exposition by means of trivialization. The point is
clear: Definitions are tautologies. Definitions are conventions. Hence
definitions are not subject to dispute other than in the purely lexicographical
sense of dispute about how words are actually used in common, scholarly or scientific
parlance.
Definitions
do no more than facilitate communication. Having agreed to use certain words to
denote certain persons, things, places, or phenomena we must then decide what
we want to say about them. A “table” is defined as a “smooth, flat slab
fixed on legs.” Fine, but nothing in that definition compels anyone to put food
upon the table at meal time, or to use the table as a surface upon which to
support writing materials. Assuredly, knowledge of the meaning of the word
“table” does not dispatch any person to a furniture store to buy a table
posthaste. Man is defined by Aristotle as a rational animal. Yet acceptance of
that definition does not compel the conclusion that cannibalism is odious or
that carnivorous behavior is morally acceptable. The moral judgment that homo
sapiens should be accorded certain privileges and immunities must be
established on grounds which are other than semantic in nature.
Let
us assume, arguendo, that dolphins are rational creatures. Would it then
follow that dolphins are human beings? Neither the zoologist nor the man in the
street would answer in the affirmative. Would dolphins be entitled to
nondiscriminatory treatment together with fellow rational creatures, i.e. homo
sapiens? An Aristotelian moralist might well answer this question in the
affirmative. It would turn out that, for him, rationality is not the definition
of humanity but the sufficient criterion for certain treatment. The question of
dignity, privileges and immunities to be accorded members of various species
within the animal kingdom is a matter falling within the province of moral
philosophers, theologians, legislators and jurists. Pinpointing the physical or
cerebral attributes which distinguish various species from one another is the
task of the zoologist. Reporting how words are used in either common or
scholarly discourse, whether such words be used with precision or imprecision,
is the task of the lexicographer whose conclusions constitute a non sequitur
insofar as scholars in other disciplines are concerned.
The
definition of the term “death” is no different from the definition of any other
term. The task of defining the term properly belongs to a lexicographer whose
findings are essentially reportorial in nature. Other than in an Orwellian 1984
society fin (which we may well be living) definition by means of legislative
fiat is nonsensical. More significantly, the act of definition provides no
basis whatsoever for moral conclusions of any nature. To be sure, common usage,
which serves as the progenitor of any formal definition, may reflect a vox
populi moral stance which influences language usage. However, it can hardly
be claimed that there must exist a necessary causal connection which mandates
the inference of a moral cause from a semantic effect. Moreover, even were that
to be the case, any argumentum adgentem of such nature would of
necessity be subject to scrutiny through the prism of moral theory.
There
is nothing mysterious or mystical about the use of most words in human
discourse. Nor, with regard to most words, is there anything arcane about the
parameters of usage – and hence the definition-of any given term. The common
law definition of death is nothing more than the adoption for legal purposes of
the term as it was-and continues to be-used in common parlance. To be sure,
that definition is a tautology – as is every definition. But words are assigned
certain meanings because they are needed as a form of verbal shorthand for the
communication of concepts. The term “death,” particularly as predicated of
human beings, was made synonymous, not with decomposition of the body, the
onset of putrefaction, or with rigor mortis, but with the cessation of
respiration and cardiac function, precisely because it is at that stage that
the human organism is beyond medical treatment. As such, it is no more than an
empirical statement, devoid of any value judgment. Moralists of bygone ages
were perfectly capable of debating the issue of euthanasia, both active and
passive, despite this definition-or better, because of the definition. It is
precisely because death is defined in terms of criteria which reflect the
empirical impossibility of continued medical treatment that there is room for
debate concerning withholding of treatment (passive euthanasia) or overt
“negative treatment” (active euthanasia) at a stage prior to death when
treatment, both positive and negative, is yet efficacious.
Time
of death statutes are not lexicographical exercises. Any attempt to categorize
them as merely legislative reflection of more precise language usage is an act
of intellectual or moral dishonesty and possibly both. Neither is it correct to
state that such statutes reflect advanced scientific knowledge and expertise.
It must be emphasized that there is absolutely no medical, scientific or
factual issue involved in the “time of death” controversy.
Definitions
for legal purposes do not – and need not – reflect common usage. A definition
for statutory purposes is designed to influence, not speech, but conduct.
Adoption of neurological criteria of death for legal purposes generates a legal
state in which a patient manifesting such criteria enjoys the rights,
immunities and privileges, not of a human being, but of a corpse. It is a
statement, not of ontological fact, but of how society wishes to treat a human
being in that particular physiological state. This is no more than the
legislative embodiment of a value judgment. Essentially, it is a decision to
withhold treatment from a person manifesting a given clinical profile. It is
not a judgment that further medical treatment will be of no avail. There is no
requirement, legal or moral, that a physician must employ therapy which is
entirely useless and represents nothing more than an exercise in futility. It
is precisely because the patient is not beyond medical treatment that a
determination not to employ treatment is advocated, i.e., it is precisely
because bodily functions, including, but not limited to, cardiac activity and
body metabolism, can be preserved by continued medical treatment that a
decision not to treat is advocated.
The
term “Time of Death Statute” is a misnomer. The only accurate term is
“Withholding of Treatment Statute.” The sole question worthy of debate is:
Should treatment be provided for an irreversibly terminal patient who manifests
clinical symptom x, y or z?
That
question poses a moral issue, not a question of medical fact or judgment. The
physician is uniquely qualified to diagnose illness, to describe the physical
damage suffered by the patient, to make a judgment with regard to the probable
prognosis and to assess available modes of therapy. But, subsequent to
determination of those clinical matters, the decision to treat or not to treat
is a value judgment, not a medical decision.
Adoption
of a brain death statute is nothing other than a moral judgment to the effect
that there is no human value which augurs in favor of the preservation of the
life of an irreversibly comatose patient. That is a question with regard to
which reasonable men may differ. It is certainly a question with regard to
which religious traditions have differed.
The
attempt to justify withholding of treatment under the guise of redefinition of
terms is a thinly-veiled attempt to secure moral and emotional approbation for
a policy which would otherwise be greeted with repugnance and even indignation.
It is the deeply held conviction of many, and probably of the majority, that
all human life is sacred and inviolate. Withholding of treatment has the effect
of snuffing out human life. Any ad hoc decision to act in such a manner
involves a great deal of soul-searching and frequently engenders feelings of
guilt. On the other hand, no one advocates medical treatment or continuation of
life-support systems for a corpse. Pronouncing a person dead has the emotional
effect of removing any aura of further moral responsibility. Such a process is,
however, intellectually dishonest. In a less than fully informed world
lexicographical sleight of hand may affect popular perception, but it should
not be permitted to affect the universe of moral discourse.
The argument in favor of withholding treatment from the irreversibly comatose patient can be formulated in one of two ways. It may be asserted that such life is entirely devoid of value and of no moral significance. There are some who would clearly espouse such a position. Those who do so bear the burden of formulating in a clear and precise manner the necessary attributes of humanhood which are correlative with human life endowed with value and moral significance. There is surely no reason for accepting neurological dysfunction as the sole point of demarcation serving to distinguish between life which is morally significant and life which is devoid of value. It is no accident that many of those who adopt the radical “no value” approach are quite willing to accept other quality of life tests and to adopt the position that in absence of a certain quality threshold, preservation of life is not a value and generates no imperative. They then differ among themselves only in regard with the nature or threshold of the quality of life which is to constitute the dividing line.
If
religious traditions exercise any meaningful role in the formulation of public
policy it is in the presentation of a value system against which proposed
policies must be evaluated. It would, of course, be incorrect to assume that
all religious traditions speak with one voice with regard to every aspect of
any broad moral issue. Nevertheless, universal affirmation of the sanctity of
human life in all of its guises is the cornerstone of all religious teaching.
The isolated utterances of some theologians which may lend themselves to such
interpretation notwithstanding, it is difficult to find a religious figure of
standing who would accept the thesis that any human life is utterly devoid of
value. Were adoption of the policies under discussion to be possible only if
predicated upon a value judgment negating the sanctity of such life, those
policies would be in opposition to the traditions and values propagated by the
world’s major religions over a period of millennia.
However,
the argument in support of withholding treatment from an irreversibly comatose
patient may be formulated in an entirely different manner. It is not necessary
to deny the moral value of human life even in a moribund and non-sentient state
in order to advocate, in a morally cogent manner, a policy of non-treatment.
Arguably, such a policy might be justified on the grounds that it is designed
to further other values which, at least under the given circumstances, are more
compelling.
A
moral system, by virtue of its very nature, must posit a set of values. Yet no
moral system can demand that its adherents promote each and every value in
every conceivable situation. Truth-telling is a value. But surely, all
ethicists would agree that not only is telling a lie in order to conceal the
location of a dangerous weapon from a madman not a violation of any moral code,
but is morally mandated. Every moral maxim must be understood as qualified by a
ceteris paribus clause. The posited value is clearly a moral desideratum
and in a Utopian universe would always be achievable. But in the real
world, moral values are frequently in conflict with one another in the sense
that not all moral values can possibly be pursued or achieved simultaneously.
Insofar as the example of the madman and the dangerous weapon is concerned,
both truth-telling and preservation of life are values which ought to be
promoted. But it is impossible to have one’s moral cake and to eat it also.
Truth-telling in that situation will result in loss of human life. Preservation
of life will entail a lie.
What
does a moral agent do when two values come into conflict with one another?
Every system of ethics must either establish a hierarchical ranking of the
values it posits or must formulate canons for decision-making which enable a
moral agent to adjudicate between competing values. When the conflict is
between truth-telling and preservation of life the dilemma is readily
resolvable. Assuredly, in a system of weighted values, a white lie pales into
insignificance when measured against the value of human life.
In
other situations the resolution of conflicting claims that arise from competing
values is far less obvious. The Declaration of Independence speaks of men as
endowed by their Creator with certain “unalienable rights,” a phrase which is
synonymous with what philosophers speak of as principles of natural law. The
underlying notion is that every individual is created by God and endowed by Him
with certain prerogatives which are inalienable in nature. Those rights, in the
eyes of our founding fathers, include “life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness.” In the philosophy of John Locke this notion was phrased a bit
differently. Locke spoke of life, liberty and the enjoyment of property. To the
American mind, the concept of happiness is apparently reducible, at least in
part, to enjoyment of property. The “unalienable rights” of which the
Declaration of Independence speaks represent fundamental values. Individuals
are endowed with life and have a God-given right to have that life safeguarded
and protected. Individuals are endowed with liberty, and no person ought to
interfere with the personal autonomy of any other human being. Individuals are
entitled to the pursuit of happiness and to the undisturbed enjoyment of their
property.
However,
in the real world, the value known as preservation of life frequently comes
into conflict either with happiness or with its analogue, preservation of property.
After all, society has access only to a finite amount of material resources, or
so we are told. What happens when preservation of life simply costs too much?
Preservation of life may be deemed to cost too much in terms of the expenditure
of resources and services in prolonging that life. Alternatively, preservation
of life may cost too much in emotional coin, because the patient is in pain,
the family in a state of anguish, or the physicians experience frustration
because, their diligent ministrations notwithstanding, they are incapable of
effecting a cure. What happens when a conflict arises between preservation of
life and promotion of happiness? Happiness and elimination of pain are, after
all, but two sides of the same coin. In the real world such values often come
into conflict with one another.
Well-intentioned
individuals may differ with regard to the proper resolution of such
dilemmas. Different religious traditions have certainly presented divers
answers. A moral system which distinguishes between “ordinary means” versus
“extraordinary means” or which sanctions the withholding of “heroic measures”
has not rendered a decision that human life which requires heroic measures or
extraordinary means for its preservation is of no moral value. Rather, it has
recognized that certain factors render the mode of treatment heroic or
extraordinary by virtue of the fact that those factors represent other values
which must be compromised or sacrificed in order to preserve the life in
question. The pain and suffering, or even the inconvenience involved, may be
such a confliction value. The sheer cost of treatment may constitute such a
value. The emotional distress and suffering caused to others may be such a
value. A position which states that a woman suffering from cancer of the cervix
need not submit to a gynecological examination at the hands of a male physician
asserts that preservation of feminine modesty is such a value. In each instance
the sanction provided for withholding treatment involves a decision that
preservation of life is indeed value but is, in effect, but one value among
many. Hence, under certain circumstances, preservation of life is rendered
subservient to preservation of other values.
It
is clear that the Catholic tradition asserts that preservation of life is but
one value among many. Jewish tradition, on the other hand, teaches that
preservation of life is of paramount value and that virtually all other values
are rendered subservient to the transcendental value of preservation of human life.
Certainly,
public policy should recognize that different religious systems resolve moral
dilemmas in different ways. It is established public policy in our country that
diverse systems of religious values be recognized and accommodated. Indeed,
such accommodation is constitutionally mandated save in the face of compelling
state interest. In manifold areas pertaining to employment, education and
family law such accommodation is required by virtue of legislative fiat and/or
judicial mandate. Diverse value systems are certainly entitled to the same
recognition and accommodation in matte pertaining to bioethical issues.
Recognition
of the claims of diverse religious traditions is essentially a matter of civil
liberty. For this reason it is certainly arguable that the State should not
interfere with an individual’s right to be treated as a living human organism
even though he may be comatose or be in a so-called vegetative state, but that
the State is under no parallel obligation to force treatment upon such persons
against their previously announced will. Nor is the State necessarily compelled
to treat the termination of the life of such a person as an act of homicide to
be punished in the appropriate manner set forth in the penal code. The State
need merely acknowledge that it respects and accommodates the religious and
moral beliefs of all of its citizens and will not treat a person, or allow him
to be treated, in a manner which is repugnant to him. Of course, one who
interferes with the legally protected civil liberties of another is a
lawbreaker. But society may well declare the appropriate punishment to be that
which is prescribed for violation of civil liberties, rather than that provided
for homicide. Thus there is no anomaly between adoption of neurological
criteria of death in a criminal code and incorporation of a so-called
“religious exemption” provision in other areas of law.
The
selfsame principles of liberty and personal autonomy as well as the provisions
of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment should serve to guarantee
that even when statutes provide that neurological criteria may be employed for
purposes of pronouncing a patient dead or, more accurately, that neurological
criteria may be employed for purposes of withholding further treatment, such
criteria should not be utilized for the purpose of removing or denying
life-support mechanisms in violation of a patient’s religious or moral
convictions.
To
be sure, the first amendment has long been understood as providing absolute
immunity with regard to matters of religious belief but not as providing
absolute license in matters of religious practice. As early as 1879 the Supreme
Court ruled in Reynold vs. United States that a free exercise claim
could not be asserted as a defense against prosecution for violation of the
statutes prohibiting the practice of bigamy. Yet not every state interest or
concern can justify the placing of a burden or restriction upon the right to
practice one’s religion freely. Thus in Schneider vs. State the Supreme
Court ruled that the state’s interest in preventing the littering of public
streets cannot justify a municipal ordinance which would effectively ban
dissemination of religious literature. More recently, in Sherbet vs. Verner,
the Supreme Court ruled that the state must ordinarily grant exemption from
provisions of law in order to permit the free exercise of religion. Once a
claimant has shown that the challenged regulation imposes some significant
burden upon the free exercise of his or her religion, it becomes incumbent upon
the state to demonstrate that the regulation, or the denial of an exemption, is
necessary in order to protect a compelling state interest. Such accommodations
can be denied, the Court declared, only in the face of “some substantial threat
to public health, safety, peace or order.”
It
is quite difficult to identify a state interest which is compelling as to
warrant application of neurological criteria of death in violation of a
patient’s free exercise rights. It must be remembered that the harvesting of
organs even in order to save the life of others, laudable as that purpose may
be, is not sanctioned by law other than upon the previously granted consent of
the deceased or of the next of kin. Hence the need to preserve the life of
another person cannot constitute a compelling state interest under such
circumstances since, in matters pertaining to organ transplants, that goal may
readily be thwarted. It may also be contended that allowing a patient to occupy
a bed in an ICU renders that bed unavailable for use by another patient for
whom the availability of such a bed may literally be a matter of life and
death. Assuredly, the state does have a compelling interest in preserving life
and in restoring its citizens to good health. Yet, as applied to the matter
under discussion, the argument is entirely specious.
Nothing
in current law or administrative regulations prevents hospitals or health care
professionals from exercising their own judgment in deciding how to allocate
scarce medical resources or in deciding which patient to treat when all
patients cannot be treated. It is tragic that triage decisions must ever be
made, yet emergency room personnel are not infrequently called upon to make
such decisions and do so in accordance with their own best medical judgment.
Similarly, patients may be removed from the ICU and placed elsewhere when other
patients have greater need of, or may derive greater benefit from, the ICU
facility. It is not at all argued that a free exercise claim can be asserted when
to do so would prevent the exercise of sound medical judgment and thereby
rebound to the detriment of others.
Moreover,
the law has long recognized that, even when a free exercise claim cannot be
asserted in order to compel privileged treatment, there exists a “zone of
permissible accommodation” within which the law may legitimately accommodate
religious practices. Thus, a school may institute a program of released time in
order to facilitate religious instruction, Sabbath observers may be exempted
from restrictions against commercial activity on Sunday, conscientious
objectors may be exempted from military service, etc. In a pluralistic society,
recognition and respect for the religious convictions and practices of others
is a social value of the highest importance. It may cogently be argued that
exemption from a requirement that death be pronounced on the basis of
neurological criteria, when such determination would violate sincerely held
religious convictions, is a constitutionally protected right. But, even if not
constitutionally mandated, such religious convictions are no less deserving of
accommodation than are matters of far less pressing concern.
There
is another area, in particular, in which public policy ought to be informed by
religious tradition. The fundamental values recognized in the American
constitution are “life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.” Although
religious traditions have differed with regard to the resolution of conflicts
which arise between the competing claims of life and the pursuit of happiness,
they are far closer with regard to the adjudication of competing claims
presented by espousal of preservation of life on one hand and of liberty on the
other.
The
concept of a Natural Death Act is, on the surface, nothing more than the
logical outgrowth of a libertarian ideal. Man’s personal affairs are his own
concern. As long as his actions do not infringe upon the rights and freedoms of
others the State should maintain a laissez faire attitude. Why, then,
should this not extend to the individual’s autonomy with regard to his very
life? Ostensibly, this is the philosophical commitment which finds legislative
expression in the Natural Death Act. As stated in the preamble of the
California statute this legislation is enacted in the “interest of protecting
individual autonomy” and is designed to assure “the dignity and privacy which
patients have the right to expect.” As presented in this declaration of values,
personal freedom is allowed untrammeled expression. The competing claim of
preservation of life is not acknowledged even for purposes of negation.
The
touchstone of a democratic society is the concept of individual freedom and
personal autonomy. Democratic societies are certainly dedicated to the
maximization of personal freedom and find it necessary to justify any violation
of personal privacy and any intrusion into the personal affairs of their
citizens. These democratic traditions stand diametrically opposed to the
absolutism which is the hallmark of the autocratic systems of government whose
excesses cause so much human suffering.
No
one will dispute the claim that personal freedom and individual autonomy are
religious values as well. Yet, it is readily apparent that, in a hierarchical
ranking of values, the values of personal freedom and autonomy do not occupy a
position within a religiously oriented ethical system identical to that which
they occupy in a secular system of values. That certainly is the case insofar
as Jewish tradition is concerned. The “religious” view with regard to the
parameters of personal autonomy are eloquently expressed in the writings of the
sixteenth-century rabbinic authority, Rabbi David ibn Zimra (Radbaz), the
author of one of the principal commentaries on Maimonides’ classic compendium
of Jewish law, the Mishneh Torah. Radbaz formulates his thesis regarding
personal autonomy by focusing upon what appears to be a contradiction between
two fundamental principles of Jewish law.
There
is a principle of Jewish jurisprudence which provides that an individual may
appear before a court and make a statement prejudicial to his own financial
interests and that such statement will be accepted without question or
qualification. This is true even if the statement is contradicted by the
testimony of a hundred trustworthy and credible witnesses. For example, Mr. A.
may appear in court and say, “I have borrowed $100 from Mr. B. on such and such
a day and I have not returned the money.” The court will order him to return
the money even if a hundred witnesses appear and testify that the story of the
loan is a complete fabrication.
However,
with regard to criminal procedure, Jewish law contains a provision which goes
far beyond the Fifth Amendment. The Fifth Amendment provides simply that an
individual cannot be compelled to give testimony against himself. Nevertheless,
confessions of guilt are not barred and, indeed, are commonly accepted by
American courts. Jewish law declares not only that a witness can not be
compelled to testify against himself, but that, in criminal matters, any
statement which is prejudicial to the interests of the defendant is
inadmissible if the statement comes from the mouth of the defendant himself. No
individual can be convicted on the basis of his own testimony and no individual
is accorded credence in declaring himself to be a criminal.
Radbaz’s
problem lies in the obvious contradiction presented by these two rules. Either
a person is to be granted credence with regard to statements prejudicial to his
own interests or he is to be regarded as lacking credibility with regard to his
own deeds. If his statements are to be given weight, they should be given the
same weight in criminal matters as they are given in matters of jurisprudence.
On the other hand, if statements made by an individual are regarded as
untrustworthy and unreliable insofar as they pertain to himself and to his own
interests, such statements should be dismissed out of hand in civil proceedings
just as they are in criminal matters.
The
answer, as Radbaz phrases it, is really very simple. After all, observes
Radbaz, an individual’s material possessions and financial resources are his to
dispose of as he wishes. A person’s money is his own. If he wishes, he is at
perfect liberty to make a gift of his funds to another person. If he chooses to
invoke the judicial process as an instrument of accomplishing that end, the law
will be happy to accommodate him. It may be nothing more than a charade, but
there is more than one way to skin a cat and more than one way to bestow a
gift. Accordingly, if a person wishes to make a gift to another by harnessing
the judicial process in order to do so, so be it. However, in confessing guilt,
an individual who faces prosecution on criminal charges and who, if found
guilty, is subject either to corporal or capital punishment, is not giving away
his money but is disposing of his body and his life. Judaism teaches that man
has no proprietary interest either in his life or in his body. Man’s body and
his life are not his to give away. The proprietor of all human life is none
other than God Himself. As Radbaz so eloquently phrases it: “Man’s life is not
his property, but the property of the Holy One, blessed be He.”
What
then is the legal status of the relationship which exists between man and his
body? In order to understand Jewish teaching with regard to the various
problems that were raised earlier, it is helpful to draw an analogy. It should
be recognized that personal privilege as well as personal responsibility, as it
extends to the human body and to human life, are similar to the privilege and
responsibility of a bailee with regard to an object with which he has been
entrusted.
A
bailee is an individual who has accepted an object of value for safekeeping. It
is his duty to safeguard the object and to return it to its rightful owner upon
demand. Judaism teaches that, with regard to his body, man is but a steward
charged with preservation of this most precious of objects and must abide by
limitations placed upon his rights of use and enjoyment. Hence, any claim to
absolute autonomy is specious.
This
moral stance is reflected in the mores of society at large, although not to the
same degree. Despite our society’s commitment to individual liberty as an ideal
it recognizes that this liberty is not entirely sacrosanct. Although there are
those who wish it to be so, self-determination is not universally recognized as
the paramount human value. There is a long judicial history of
recognition of the State’s “compelling interest” in the preservation of the
life of each and every one of its citizens, an “interest” which carries with it
the right to curb personal freedom. What the jurist calls a “compelling state
interest” the theologian terms “sanctity of life.” It is precisely this concept
of the sanctity of life which, as a transcendental value, supersedes
considerations of personal freedom. This is implicitly recognized even in the
drafting of the Natural Death Act; else such legislation would grant its
citizens unequivocal authority to terminate life. Were autonomy recognized as the
paramount value, society would not shrink from sanctioning suicide, mercy
killing or indeed consensual homicide under any and all conditions.
Jewish
tradition certainly recognizes liberty as a value, but defines freedom and
liberty in a very particular way. The Mishnaic dictum, “Ve-lo attah ben
horin le-hibbatel mimmennah” (Ethics of the Fathers 2:16) is rendered by
the 15th century commentator Isaac Abarbanel, not in the usual manner as “Nor
are you free to desist from it,” i.e., from obedience to the Law, but as “Nor
in desisting from it are you a free man.” Freedom, declares Abarbanel, is not
to be defined as license to do as one wishes; freedom is the ability to develop
human potential, to fulfil the human telos. Freedom is the absence of constraint
which would interfere with such realization. Hence casting off the yoke of law
is not an act of freedom but its antithesis. The concept is very similar to
what the British philosopher T.H. Green called “positive freedom.”
This
is true for other religious traditions as well. Liberty, as the term is
conventionally understood, is a paramount value only when it does not conflict
with other divinely established values. In secular terms, personal autonomy
must give way to preservation of the social fabric. The state has an interest,
which is entirely secular in nature, in the preservation of the life of each of
its citizens. Absent other competing interests, it may assert its authority in
compelling the preservation of a life against the wishes of a citizen despite
the deprivation of liberty which is entailed thereby because public policy
accepts the moral thesis that the preservation of life be regarded as a
superior value taking precedence over the right to privacy and the value of
personal autonomy.
Our
society, for good moral reasons, has refused to recognize that the right to
autonomy and personal privacy is of sufficient breadth that it may encompass a
“right” to dispose of one’s life as one wishes. It is clear that such a claim
could not be sustained even were it to be predicated upon religious belief.
Courts have consistently intervened and have refused to allow parents to
withhold medical treatment from minor children and, in doing so, have refused
to acknowledge that a right to family privacy constitutes a barrier to
intervention by the state. In numerous cases, courts have ordered blood
transfusions despite objections by parents on grounds of religious conviction.
Recently, in the case of a child suffering from bone cancer, the Supreme Court
of the state of Tennessee ordered administration of chemotherapy despite
religious objections interposed by a clergyman parent.
Cases
of this nature test the outermost limits of a policy of accommodation of
religious beliefs and practices. The Tennessee case, in particular, generated a
great deal of debate and evoked much sympathy for the parents, particularly
because the issue of familial privacy was coupled with infringement upon
religious liberty.
Yet
imagine the following hypothetical: a group of Aztec Indians cling to the
belief that health and prosperity can be assured only by sacrificing the heart
of a young maiden to a pagan sun-deity. An adolescent girl, fully convinced
that she will earn eternal merit and bliss thereby, grants consent to her
father to perform the sacrificial ritual. Our society would surely intervene to
prevent the parties to act in such a manner. Nary a dissenting voice would be
raised in protest despite the clear violation of otherwise constitutionally
guaranteed rights.
The parens
patriae doctrine is a legal formulation of the ranking of values within an
ethical system. Liberty is not regarded as the paramount value in all
situations.
Preservation
of life, at least in some circumstances, is perceived as constituting a higher
value than protection of individual autonomy. The “compelling state interest”
which is present in such cases is of sufficient moral force to warrant denial
of the free exercise of religion. As applied in cases of this nature, that too,
paradoxical as it may sound, reflects the influence of the dominant religious
tradition upon formulation of public policy.
The
issue becomes much more complex when quality of life considerations are added
to complicate the moral dilemma. Insofar as adults are concerned, society,
through the judicial branch of government, has been willing to allow
considerations of individual autonomy and respect for personal privacy to be
given precedence over preservation of life when the quality of the life to be
preserved has been diminished significantly. In Quinlan the court dealt
with what is essentially a matter of the balancing of two antagonistic value
claims and recast the matter in nonmoral terms in declaring that the State
interest in preservation of life diminishes in direct proportion to the
diminution of the quality of the life in question.
At
the same time, the courts have shown utmost reluctance to apply a similar
approach in the case of minors. This disparity is strikingly evident in the
juxtaposition of two decisions handed down by the Court of Appeals of New York
on the same day, March 31, 1981. In the famed Brother Fox case the court
authorized the withholding of medical treatment prolonging the life of Brother
Fox who was judged to be in a “chronic vegetative state” with no reasonable
chance of recovery. Simultaneously, in In Matter of Storar the court
ordered the administration of blood transfusions to a profoundly retarded
fifty-two year old man with terminal cancer of the bladder. This order was
issued against the wishes of the patient’s mother who refused consent on the
ground that the transfusions would only prolong the patient’s discomfort. In Storar
the court equated the status of a profoundly retarded individual with that
of a minor and declared that the patient’s guardian could not make a
determination to decline blood transfusions, just as the parents or guardian of
an infant could not so decide.
In a
1979 decision in Berman vs. Adler The Supreme Court of New Jersey
declared:
One
of the most deeply held beliefs of our society is that life – whether
experienced with or without a major physical handicap – is more precious than
non – life... Nowhere... is there to be found an indication that the lives of
persons suffering from physical handicaps are to be less cherished than those
of non-handicapped human beings. We recognize that... [her] abilities will be
more circumscribed than those of normal, healthy children and that she, unlike
them, will experience a great deal of physical and emotional pain and anguish.
We sympathize with her plight. We cannot, however, say that she would have been
better off had she never been brought into the world. Notwithstanding her
affliction, [she] by virtue of her birth, will be able to love and be loved and
experience happiness and pleasure – emotions which are truly the essence of
life and which are far more valuable than the suffering she may endure. To rule
otherwise would require us to disavow the basic assumption upon which our
society is based. This we cannot do.
These
principles are not negated by the recent decision of the New York courts in the
matter of Baby Jane Doe. News reports to the contrary, the Appellate Division
of the New York Supreme Court did not rule that parents have the right to
withhold lifesaving therapy from their child. The case tried in the courtroom
was not the case tried in the pages of the newspaper. The courts did not rule
that there exists a right of familial privacy which bars judicial interference
even when the life of a child is threatened. The parens patriae doctrine
is far too deeply ingrained in the common law tradition to permit any such
finding. The appellate court simply ruled that, when alternate forms of therapy
are available, it is the parents who have the right to choose which therapy
should be administered. That, too, is good sense and good law – at least in
theory.
Application
of this principle to the case of Baby Jane Doe is another matter entirely. The
“conservative therapy” chosen by the parents was administration of antibiotics
and palliative treatment. Chances of survival for any significant period of
time are nil; were the surgical route pursued, longevity anticipation would be
greatly enhanced. Treating spina bifida with antibiotics instead of by surgery
is not very different from treating cancer with aspirin rather than by means of
chemotherapy. Any physician would candidly concede that such “alternate
therapy” is tantamount to non-treatment.
Surely
the court knew this as well. As Voltaire remarked, hypocrisy is the homage vice
pays to virtue.
Why,
then, the subterfuge? Why not call a spade a spade and espouse a doctrine which
permits passive euthanasia with parental consent? The answer must lie in the
fact that, when confronted by a moral dilemma, society prefers not to make hard
choices between competing values when each value deserves to be upheld on its
own merits.
That
does not mean that given the same, or perhaps slightly altered, circumstances,
the decision of Baby Jane’s parents to withhold consent for surgery may not
have been justified – but on entirely different grounds. All hazardous medical
procedures which, if unsuccessful, may precipitate death present a harsh
choice: the gamble of a brief, but uncertain, life-span for the sake of
uncertain, but much enhanced, longevity. Every moment of life, no matter how
ephemeral, is sacred and endowed with infinite value. A prudent person does not
lightly risk the loss of that which is greatly valued even for the possibility
of greater gain. A bird in hand is indeed worth two in the bush. Such a gamble
is discretionary at best and is warranted only when the risk-benefit ratio is
favorable. But the values to be weighed are life versus life, not life versus
privacy, or life versus liberty.
To
be sure, in a pluralistic society, disparate value judgments with regard to
newly-arising questions of moral concern are to be anticipated. Public policy
must be formulated within broad parameters of social morality to allow for
diversity within unity. The strength of American democracy lies in its system
of law which reflects a keen sensitivity for the accommodation of diverse value
systems in forging “one nation, under God, with liberty and justice for all.”
Source: ASSIA
– Jewish Medical Ethics,
Vol. I, No. 1, May 1988, pp. 17-24
* Delivered at a symposium on “Commissioning Morality: An Assessment the
President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and
Research,” The New School for Social Research, May 17, 1984.